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Abstract:  
 
The Napoleonic Wars saw the British capture and incarcerate thousands of sailors in disused Royal Navy 
ships, the so-called prison hulks. Many Danes and Norwegians – navy personnel, privateers and merchant 
sailors– were thus interred. This article uses a new data source, the official record books kept in the 
National Archive at Kew, to test whether the prison hulks were as bad as popular perception might 
suggest. In doing so, we provide the first rigorous quantitative assessment of the Danish and Norwegian 
sailors’ prisoner experience. We find that death rates were surprisingly low, suggesting the quantity and 
quality of food and medical care was reasonable. Prison hulks were not “floating tombs”. The records also 
show which prisoners were released and exchanged, and when. Officers did well, reflecting the age old 
system of a gentleman’s honour. Privateers did worse than merchant sailors: those who took up arms were 
likely to serve longer as prisoners. 
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Surprisingly gentle confinement: British treatment of Danish and Norwegian prisoners of war 
during the Napoleonic Wars 
 
1. Introduction 
  
For most of history, life as a prisoner of war was nasty, brutish and short. Prisoners could be 
treated as slaves, to be worked, sold or killed at will. Only the lucky rich could be hoped to be 
ransomed. The first big step forward was the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which allowed 
prisoners to return home without ransom at the end of a war. It said nothing, however, about 
their treatment when in captivity. The first regulation as to the treatment of prisoners while in 
captivity was Lincoln’s Lieber Code of 1863, written midway through the American Civil War. It 
went on to become the basis of the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1929 and 1949 (Costa & Kahn, 2008). For prisoners in the Napoleonic era, 
therefore, there were no legal or informal conventions as to how they could be treated. The 
way they were treated, and their likelihood of survival, was very much up to those into whose 
hands they fell.  
This article looks at the treatment of Danish and Norwegian sailors captured by the British 
in the Napoleonic era. The British navy had attacked Copenhagen, taken the Danish navy fleet 
and defeated the Danes thoroughly, albeit without formally declaring war. Denmark  (whose 
empire included Norway at this point), was a third rate European power and one of the last 
neutral countries in Europe by 1807, but its navy was a significant prize to be taken by either 
Napoleon or Britain, who both wooed the strategically important entrance to the Baltic Sea 
through the Danish straits. Unlike the French however, Denmark-Norway was hardly an arch 
enemy of the British, but in the face of two ultimate demands from France and Britain 
respectively, the Danish king sided with Napoleon’s empire in the aftermath of what became 
known as the Battle of Copenhagen. With regards the prisoners of war entering British captivity 
from late 1807 onwards, most of them were merchant sailors, rather than fighting men at sea 
to attack the British. It is noteworthy that all captives, civilian as well as military, were treated 
as prisoners in this era. The notion that only military captives are prisoners of war is a more 
recent development. Against that, looking after prisoners is costly. They need to be fed, 
accommodated, and their healthcare needs attended to. Groups in close confinement have 
always been prone to the spread of disease, implying high death rates. And while most 
captured Danes were merchant sailors, not all had benign reasons to be at sea. Some were in 
the Danish navy, while others were privateers, licenced by the Danish crown to harass and 
capture British vessels.  
This article proceeds as follows. We first introduce the Napoleonic wars, setting out the 
role of England and Denmark-Norway, and emphasising the scale of the conflict. We then go on 
to say a little more about the treatment of prisoners of war in the early to mid-nineteenth 
century in general. We will then review the qualitative literature concerning conditions on 
board prison hulks, and highlight its importance in Danish and Norwegian historiography. We 
then move onto the substantive contribution of this paper: the first quantitative analysis of the 
experiences of captured sailors, seeking to explain the duration of their captivity and the 
likelihood of dying while a prisoner.  
 In doing so, we will show that the conditions under which captives were held were 
surprising gentle. The length of captivity was sufficiently long that problems such as insufficient 
food would have manifested themselves in a death rate far higher than that which we observe. 
The contrast with, for example, the conditions and outcomes documented in Costa and Hahn’s 
work on American Prisoner of War camps is dramatic. 
 
 
  
2. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars 
 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars lasted from 1792 until 1815, with a single year of peace 
in 1802-3. Broadly speaking, these wars saw France fight a changing coalition of European 
powers, including at different times the British, Austrians, Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Spanish 
and Portuguese.  
 These wars were critical to the evolution of modern day Denmark and Norway.  The 
eighteenth century Danish-Norwegian empire was far-reaching. From his capital in 
Copenhagen, the King could look north to Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, 
west to the Danish West Indies, east to Tranquebar in India, and south to Schleswig-Holstein, 
and part of present day Ghana. Denmark and Norway were the core of the empire. They were 
economically well-integrated, with Denmark producing grain, and Norway timber and fish. The 
outbreak of the revolutionary wars created an unprecedented economic boom for the neutral 
Danish-Norwegian state. Freight rates soared and Denmark-Norway successfully traded with 
everyone, supported by their navy upholding a policy of armed neutrality.  The French conquest 
of Prussia led England to fear that Denmark-Norway – and with it sea access to the Baltic, 
crucial for grain and timber – would fall to Napoleon. The British offered Denmark-Norway an 
alliance, while Napoleon threatened to invade unless Denmark-Norway joined the alliance 
against England. The Danes did neither, and the British besieged Copenhagen in 1807, capturing 
the Danish and Norwegian fleets. Thus Denmark and Norway became England’s enemy and 
Napoleon’s ally. It remained so until the end of the war (Munch-Petersen, 2007). 
 Napoleon lost the war, and the 1814 Treaty of Kiel broke up the more than 400-year old 
Danish-Norwegian empire. Norway was given to Denmark’s old enemy Sweden, although 
rebellion in Norway meant that it joined Sweden in a union, rather than as a territory. This was 
an important stepping stone in Norway’s progress to becoming an independent nation, which it 
achieved peacefully in 1905. Denmark became a fourth rate European power, creating the 
modern day notion of Denmark as a small and peace-seeking nation state.  
 The Napoleonic wars were larger than any conflict seen before. The armies were larger 
than ever before – the French army, for example, peaked at 2,500,000 soldiers (Kennedy, 2004; 
pp. 128-29), more than five times the peak size of the armies of the Roman Empire (MacMullen, 
1979). The French introduced universal conscription, while the British taxed and borrowed at 
unprecedented levels (Stoker et al., 2014; Knight 2013). Whether by conscription or taxation, 
the war touched far more families than earlier wars, and proved surprisingly popular. 
Nationalism and militarism became common, and sowed the seeds for the creation of nation 
states such as Germany and Italy, and for future major conflicts culminating in two world wars 
(Bell, 2008).  
 England fought the Danish-Norwegian empire at sea rather than on land. British ships 
seized Danish military and mercantile shipping. Commanders had an incentive to capture rather 
than sink vessels, owing to the well-known ‘prize rules’ which made them and their crew rich 
from the value of the captured ships (Petrie, 1999). The British disrupted trade between 
Denmark and Norway sufficiently to cause severe shortage of grain in parts of Norway. In those 
places, both starvation and stunting occurred. (Kiil, 1939, pp. 126-35).  
 The Danish-Norwegian king issued 574 privateer licences to those wishing to capture 
British vessels. These employed almost 9,000 men. Privateers, mainly small gun boats, could 
easily capture a lone British merchant ship, whereas convoys of merchant ships were much 
safer (Bloksgaard, 2009; Feldbæk, 1997). A Danish privateer’s crew could become very rich if 
successful (Bloksgaard, 2009), although this was rare.  
 The Napoleonic wars saw unprecedented numbers of soldiers and sailors captured. 
Hundreds of thousands were captured by Napoleon’s lightning strikes into Italy, Prussia and 
ultimately Russia, and conversely hundreds of thousands of French soldiers and seamen fell 
into the hands of their adversaries. There were, for example, over 100,000 French prisoners of 
war in England alone (Daly 2004). Similarly, the British took 7,000 Danish and Norwegian sailors 
prisoner. In Norway in particular, the experiences of prisoners of war in England nurtured an 
important part of Norwegian self-identity, an emancipatory process coming of age during the 
19th century (Glenthøj, 2012). For instance in the Agder region of Southern Norway 5-10% of 
the male population wound up in a British prison between 1807-1814 (Johnsen, 2009, p. 200). 
As a consequence the subsequent two centuries have witnessed a number of historians and 
intellectuals commenting on the experience of being imprisoned by the English. 
 
3. Prisoners of War in historic context 
 
Being captured was potentially lethal. “For most of history, soldiers captured by the enemy 
were either slaughtered or enslaved to die quickly in a mine or galley ship or other lethal 
place.” So begins Costa and Kahn’s (2007) seminal article Surviving Andersonville, reminding us 
that being captured was a terrible experience for most of history.  
The emergence of the Enlightenment began a long period of almost Whiggish historical 
development, from an era in which prisoners of war were routinely enslaved, to one in which 
the Geneva Conventions govern the treatment of those captured. The first major step forward 
came in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which established the principle that prisoners of war 
should be released without ransom and allowed to return to their home country at the end of a 
war.  
This period was also characterised by the tradition of ‘parole’, whereby higher officers 
would surrender their swords and be allowed to live in an open prison, where they could enjoy 
a fairly large degree of personal freedom. In some cases they were allowed to return to their 
country, having pledged not to take up arms for the duration of the war. 
 There were no such conventions for ordinary soldiers and sailors. Although the Treaty of 
Westphalia said that they were to be allowed to return home at the end of war, it said nothing 
about the conditions under which they should be kept as captives. The nineteenth century 
showed why the Geneva Convention would be necessary. Following the Battle of Balién in 
1808, Napoleon’s General Dupont surrendered to the Spanish with over 17,000 men. Between 
a half and six-sevenths of his troops did not survive captivity (Gates, 1986; Chamberlain, 2008). 
Similarly, the treatment, or lack thereof, of the injured on the battlefield following the 1859 
Battle of Solferino led Swiss national Jean-Henri Dunant to author a book that would lead to the 
creation of the Red Cross four years later. His work also led to the creation of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1864 (treatment of the wounded), 1929 (covering prisoners of war), and 
subsequent revisions. Note however that it was not until 1929 that the appropriate treatment 
of prisoners of war was set out formally on an international basis. The American civil war saw 
Lincoln create the first code of conduct for the treatment of prisoners of war. It was, however, 
frequently ignored. The death rate was 12% in Union Prisoner of War camps, and 16% in those 
of the Confederacy, despite the fact that the average prisoner was captive for less than a year 
(Costa & Kahn, 2007). The historiography of early and mid-nineteenth century conflict leads us 
to expect that the treatment of Danes and Norwegians, captured by the British in the 
Napoleonic wars, would be abysmal, and perhaps lethal. 
 
4. Living conditions for prisoners of war held by the British in the Napoleonic era 
 
Capture of a ship by the British involved capture of a crew, who became Prisoners of War. This 
was true for all seamen, merchant navy as well as those serving in the Danish-Norwegian Navy, 
with no formal distinction. In this era, Prisoners of War held in Britain were the responsibility of 
the Admiralty Transport Office, presided over by the Commissioners. Danish and Norwegian 
seamen and lower ranking officers were held on prison ships, commonly known as ‘hulks’. 
Prison ships were commanded by a lieutenant and had a standard complement of staff, many 
recruited from among the prisoners of war (Chamberlain, 2008, pp. 58-60, 81, 45). The 
regulations stated that all ships were to have a surgeon, often a captured naval surgeon. The 
surgeon was also responsible for inspecting food, sanitary conditions, and ensuring sufficient 
clothing, blankets, etc. Prison ships were usually stationed in groups, with at least one hospital 
ship per group. The Transport Office was responsible for ensuring that medical knowledge was 
shared.   
 Officially, rations were good. Each week a prisoner was entitled to 2.5lbs of beef (just 
over 1kg) and 2lb of fish (just under 1kg). This was supplemented by 10.5 lbs of bread, 2lbs of 
potatoes, 2.5lbs of cabbage, as well as smaller amounts of scotch barley, onions, and salt. They 
were also given 14 pints (8 litres) of beer (Chamberlain, 2008, pp. 62-5). Prisoners were entitled 
to a hammock, palliasse, blanket, jacket, waistcoat, trousers, two shirts, one pair of stockings 
and a hat. All were bright yellow, to make both escape and sale harder (Chamberlain 2008, p. 
62).  
 Prisoners had formal rights to form committees to monitor food and other basics. 
Physical punishment of prisoners was formally discouraged. Those who killed another prisoner 
would be subject to the full force of English Law. In contrast Marines guarding prisoners were 
subject to physical punishment, in line with standard Naval approaches to discipline 
(Chamberlain, 2008, pp. 38, 44). 
 There can be no guarantee, of course, that regulations and reality are the same. French 
contemporaries were explicit about the horrors of captivity. For example, Captain Charles 
Dupin described the prison hulks as ‘floating tombs’, while Baron de Bonnefoux said that ‘It is 
difficult to imagine a more severe punishment’ (both quoted in Chamberlain, 2008, p. 55). In 
contrast, contemporary British authors defended the treatment given to prisoners. The 
Transport Official in charge of running the prisons said that “the prisoners were very well 
treated in every respect: their provisions in good quality, and their clothing sufficient.” (Abell, 
1914). Neither French nor British authors can be seen as unbiased. Danish prisoners did 
complain about the quantity of food, as well as the lack of alcohol and sweets. Formally at least, 
the food rations were not far from rations on board a Danish navy vessel at the time (Roos, 
1953, p. 84). They were also able to supplement their rations. For example, mutton bones were 
often carved and sold locally to raise money to buy food or other items. Eating meat or fish 
every day would not have been automatic for the general population in England, Denmark or 
Norway in this era. This ambivalent attitude of contemporary Norwegians to a period in British 
captivity is apparent in the famous Norwegian poem, Henrik Ibsen’s 1862 Terje Vigen. Terje 
Vigen rows from Norway to Denmark during the Napoleonic Wars to buy grain for his starving 
family. He is captured and held in a prison hulk . After the war he finds his family dead, and he 
himself forgotten. Vigen takes a job at sea, and one day rescues an English yacht. The captain 
recognizes Vigen as the man he had captured. Vigen threatens to take revenge, but changes his 
mind and forgives them (Johnsen, 1993, p. 7). The feeling of revenge is there, but perhaps it 
was the treatment in prison that led to forgiveness. 
 Recent historiography has tried to evaluate living conditions. Patricia Crimmin (1996) 
concluded that prisoners of war were perceived by the English as prisoners and aliens and 
sometimes as enemies and potential invaders. In addition they were resented for consuming 
scarce food, while the native population suffered through the war. Using a biographical 
approach, Norwegian historian Johnsen argues that conditions for common sailors were 
characterised by ‘suffering, hunger, assaults from wardens, illnesses, crowdedness, idleness and 
longing.’(Johnsen, 2009, pp. 285-96). In an earlier work (1993, p. 42) Johnsen stated that from a 
sample of 573 prisoners, 33 of them (5.8%) died while in captivity. 2 of these were shot, while 
‘fever,’ ‘coughing,’ ‘typhus,’ ‘measles,’ ‘atrophy’ and ‘chronical bleeding’ were noted as causes 
of death. Yet, except for being shot, these would be causes of dying also in a normal situation in 
the early 1800s, and some would have died anyway. 
 Whatever the position for common merchant seaman, the literature is clear about three 
things. First, that, despite formally equal treatment, the British treated captured Danes and 
Norwegians better than they treated captured French prisoners of war. Second, that captured 
privateers were treated less well. And third, that officers were treated well.  Lloyd for 
example, commented in 2007 that while conditions were bad for Danish and Norwegian 
prisoners, the French suffered more. The former were seen more as hostages than prisoners of 
war (Lloyd, 2007). 
 While on paper prisoners from different countries were treated similarly, eye witness 
reports concur with Lloyd’s conclusion. This is seen in the most thorough study of the Danish 
experience, Carl Roos’ (1953) Prisonen, based on correspondence between Danish and British 
authorities, as well as on diaries kept by Danish prisoners. The consul general until 1812, Jens 
Wolff, was the Danish-Norwegian representative representing the interest of the prisoners. A 
number of written testimonies on his work, suggest that he was not very active in pursuing the 
interest of the prisoners, but there is no indication that he personally sought to discriminate 
between the different types of inmates be it navy personel, civilians or privateers. Likewise 
Hornemann, who succeeded Wolff was not seen to have differentiated in this way, but given 
the relatively free position of the officers on parole, they were able to pay the consul general 
visits to his house in London.  (Roos, 1953, 163-170. 
 A clear example of how treatment differed stems from communication between the 
English Treasury and the Danish consul general as early as 1807, when the Danish authorities 
were told that their countrymen would receive twice as much for maintenance as French 
prisoners of war. A Danish priest, Rosing, who visited prison ships noted that the guards were 
much stricter with the French (Roos, 1953, p. 29). 
 By May 1809 the Danish government had struck an agreement with their British 
counterparts to enable Danish government allowances to be passed on to the imprisoned 
seamen. Payments ranged from 28 shillings per week for naval officers, to 1 shilling and 2 pence 
for common sailors. The Danish seaman Jens Krog, who kept a diary, noted that French 
prisoners did not receive such relief from their government. Neither did Swedish citizens, three 
of whom were in the same prison ship as Krog himself (Roos, 1953, pp. 90-91). 
 Not that Danish sailors always appeared grateful. When the French prisoners on a 
neighbouring prison hulk cheered and flashed lights on Napoleon’s birthday, the Danes did 
likewise. Provocations like this led the British to ban contact between ships (Roos, 1953, p.28).  
 Nor do all historians accept that the French were treated badly. Chamberlain argues 
that contemporary French authors had a motive to portray the British as villains, and the 
French (and others) as ‘the innocent victims of the fortune of war’ (Chamberlain, 2008, p.55). 
He sees many historians as confusing conditions on the prison hulks with those on the convict 
hulks, ‘whose conditions were indeed horrendous’. He argues that medical treatment was often 
effective, noting, for example, successful approaches to treating pneumonia in Stapleton Prison 
being passed to all prisons in 1807 (Chamberlain, 2008, pp 31, 33-34). 
 Johnsen notes that privateers received the worst treatment, as they were looked upon 
as common criminals, rather than bona fide prisoners of war. Bloksgaard (2007) concurs, noting 
that privateers were regarded as dishonourable. 
 Officers were unambiguously treated well. Feldbæk (1997), for example, tells the story 
of skipper Chresten Hansen Mikkelsen, who sketched his cell. This showed him to have fine 
clothes, decent cutlery, decorative sketches on the walls and even a teapot. An umbrella 
suggests that he went outside fairly often.  
 In a similar vein, a Danish naval officer, Hans Birch Dahlerup, was given parole in 
Reading following a brief stay on a prison hulk. In Reading he had a two room apartment in a 
house, where the landlady provided him with food. On Sundays he even dined with his hosts. 
He regularly received government and private funds from Denmark. After a while he rose in the 
informal ranks in the open prison, assuming the role as spokesman in correspondence between 
the Danish consul general and the British authorities. In his spare time he studied English 
language and literature (Roos, 1953, p. 194-196). All this was despite the fact that he had 
already escaped and rejoined the war against the British. He did so again – before being 
captured for the third, and final time.  He went on to have a successful naval career, rising to be 
admiral of the Austrian fleet fighting Garibaldi in the Adriatic Sea in 1849 (Jørgensen, 2002). 
 His experiences seem to have been common for officers in this era, matching the 
favourable accounts of life on parole for French officers (Daly, 2004, pp. 361-380). Thus, the 
qualitative evidence points towards differences in the treatment prisoners of war received, by 
nationality and status. 
 
5. Data 
 
Before we analyse our data, we need to establish that they are fit for purpose. The data are 
British administrative records held in the British National Archives.† The British recorded data 
about each Danish and Norwegian sailor captured during the Napoleonic Wars. They collected 
each sailor’s name, birth place, age, physical characteristics (height, build, face shape, hair and 
eye colour), the ship on which they served, the type of ship (man of war, privateer, merchant), 
their rank, where and when they were captured, the name of the prison and date of arrival 
there, and the date and reason for leaving prison.  
 These British data have since been transcribed for Danish and Norwegian use. Danish 
Genealogist Bruno Ansbjerg transcribed the data for Danish sailors.‡ The data on Norwegians is 
available digitally from the Norwegian Data Archive in Bergen. This version did not include data 
on heights, which we added ourselves from the original manuscript records in Kew.§ The total 
estimated number of prisoners from Denmark-Norway is estimated to be c. 7,000 in total, while 
the total number of prisoner at any given point in time peaked in 1809 with 3,547 prisoners in 
ten different prison camps (Scheel, 1935, p. 45-46). However, for this analysis we have focused 
our attention mainly on data from the prison camp of Chatham, East of London, from where 
particularly rich data, such as height and stature, were recorded in the prison rolls, and this was 
the prison camp with most Danish and Norwegian inmates. The total number of observations in 
this analysis is 4,261. 14% of records we investigated are incomplete: 379 prisoners (all 
                                                          
† Norwegians: The National Archive (TNA), Admiralty (ADM) 103/60, 103/61, 103/62, 103/63, 
103/64, 103/376 
‡ We would like to thank Ansbjerg, who kindly lend us his database consisting of a complete 
transcription of Danes in English prisons 1807-1814 and Aske Brock for coding the initial 
dataset. 
§ Digitalarkivet, “Norske Prisonfanger” 
https://filer.digitalarkivet.arkivverket.no/fa22001807.htm  
Norwegian) are recorded as being “transferred” to other prisons: we do not know the final 
outcomes for these prisoners. 237 records (all Danish) include no date of release. Of these, 10 
prisoners have outcomes (4 released, 3 died, 1 exchanged and 2 escaped), while the remaining 
227 are recorded as “departure reason not known”. 
 We need to establish whether the missing observations are statistically problematic. Of 
the 379 Norwegians transferred to other prisons, 311 were captured in 1807, at the start of the 
war. The most likely reason for their exclusion is that the record keeping systems were not fully 
established. The reasons for missing data for Danish prisoners are more mixed. As with 
Norwegian prisoner data, 66 of the 237 without a date of release were captured at the start of 
the war. A further 93 captured in 1811 also have no data. This looks like a sloppy clerk: 78 of 
the missing observations are sequential in the original records (records 1253 &ff).  
 The height data allows us to see whether the weak were being disposed of, perhaps on 
the quiet. There is no evidence of this. 47% of sailors captured were in their 20s. Within this 
group, the Danes who remain in the sample averaged 65.63 inches – exactly the same as those 
whose records are incomplete. The included Norwegians were 65.55 inches, while the excluded 
were 65.52, a difference of under a millimetre. The sample looks unbiased, therefore, and 
consists of 3,645 prisoners, 1,178 Danes and 2,457 Norwegians. 
 Everyone in the dataset is a man. They vary in age between 8 and 80, with half being 
between 22 and 35. They were born between 1728 and 1805, with half being born 1780-1790. 
1,960 were captured from merchant navy vessels, 746 from privateers, 559 from ‘men of war’, 
and the remaining 380 from other, including not recorded. A Dane or Norwegian giving their 
name and place of birth orally to a British person in 1810 does not guarantee an accurate 
written record of names, or places of birth. Similarly, old English handwriting is not always 
straightforward to read, especially as words were often abbreviated. Thankfully the items that 
interest us – dates of capture and release, reason for release, whether the prisoner was an 
officer or a common sailor, and their height, are readily comprehensible.  
 The books were used for fact-finding by the British authorities. Danish inmate Jens Krog 
for instance, wrote in his diary that some prisoners in Chatham tried to have extra linen and 
clothes following their transfer from Plymouth. The books were checked for the validity of such 
requests (Roos 1953, p. 87). This indicates that the record keepers had reason to keep accurate 
records. The credibility of the entries in the prison registers is what enables the following 
analysis of the quantifiable aspects of the prison experience. 
 
6. Analysis 
 
Our analysis concerns the fortunes of Danish and Norwegian sailors captured in the Napoleonic 
Wars. We are interested in their fortunes in aggregate, and whether we can explain the 
differences in the fortunes of different groups within our prisoners. We concentrate on the 
duration of captivity, and death in captivity. 
 We begin, therefore, by setting out the basic facts.  Self-evidently, there were no 
prisoners of war prior to the outbreak of war, and all prisoners had been released by the end of 
1814. In between those dates, as Table 1 shows, the number of prisoners first rose, then fell, and 
then remained steady. The fact that the system held more than 1700 for over a year suggests that 
the lower numbers towards the end of the war were a deliberate policy choice, rather than a 
physical constraint.  
The vast majority of prisoners were captured at sea from another vessel. Most of the prisoners 
were taken in waters between the two combatants, i.e. along the Norwegian coastline, in the 
Danish straits, and in the North Sea and The Channel. Fewer seamen were taken in the 
Mediterranean, while some were taken into custody as far away as The Caribbean and The 
Indian Ocean. 
 
Table 1. The number of prisoners at year end 
Year 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 
N 1,027 1,773 1,705 1,382 1,374 1,250 1,170 0 
 
Note: that these numbers relate only to prisoners whose exit dates are known. The actual 
numbers would have been higher. The excluded prisoners entered the prison of war system 
disproportionately at the start of the period, so it is likely that the 1808-9 peak is understated 
here. 
 
 
The records show that average sailor spent 933 days between being seized and being 
released. This is by no means a short period on which to be incarcerated on a prison hulk. This 
average, of course, disguises huge variation. The shortest period was just three days, and the 
longest 2,656 days – more than seven years. The standard deviation is 721. 32 per cent of seamen 
were still in captivity in 1814, as the war came to an end. This means that more than two 
prisoners in three were released during the war. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics as to the 
number of prisoners captured and released in each year.  
 
Table 2: The number of sailors captured and released by year 
Released: 
Captured:  
1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 total days in 
captivity 
1807 61 286 251 82 32 56 111 209 1,088 1,116 
1808  125 190 453 122 52 49 166 1,157 913 
1809   46 65 55 68 46 139 419 1,056 
1810    20 40 22 41 174 297 1,058 
1811     35 37 50 154 276 786 
1812      13 41 70 124 600 
1813       19 258 277 273 
1814        4 4 215 
Total 61 411 487 620 284 248 357 1,174   
days in 
captivity 
60 226 468 678 761 1074 1,402 1,424   
Note: three people are recorded as being captured prior to 1807. They are excluded from this 
table. 
 
 
Reading across the first row of table one, we find that of the sailors captured in 1807, 61 were 
released in the same year, 286 in 1808, etc. There were 1088 sailors captured in 1807, and they 
averaged 1116 days in captivity. Similarly, reading down the last substantive column shows that 
of the 1174 sailors released in 1814, 209 had been captured in 1807, 166 in 1808, etc.  
 The most common reason for prisoners leaving captivity was that they were released. 
That said, some escaped, some were exchanged, and some died. Taken as a whole, 3,221 were 
released, 191 died, 174 were exchanged and 59 escaped (their fates unknown). If we exclude 
those whose time in captivity ended in 1814 (and as such were released because of the end of 
the war, rather than because of any decision by the British), then we find that 2,130 were 
released, 108 died, 174 were exchanged, and 58 escaped. Thus we find that a straightforward 
release while war was underway was the most likely outcome for any prisoner, accounting for 
58% of cases. Next came release at the end of the war, representing 30% of cases. Exchanges 
and Deaths represented 5% of cases each, while 2% escaped.   
 In total, 191 of the 3,645 seamen about whom we have full details died in custody. The 
average number of people in captivity at each year end (1807-1814 inclusive) was 1,210, 
implying 19.7 deaths per 1000 inmates. This is six times as high as in modern UK jails, who are 
in turn about a quarter more likely to die than the modern general public.** We do not have 
any age-specific mortality data for Danes or Norwegians in this era.  
 As mentioned earlier, this is a radically lower death rate than for Spanish prison hulks, 
where the majority died. We have no good data on background age specific mortality rates in 
Denmark or Norway with which to compare this number. The average age of prisoners on 
arrival was 29, and life expectancy of English men at age 30 in 1750-99 was 32.1 years (Wrigley 
and Schofield, 1989, p. 252, table 7.21), implying a mortality rate of around 2.2 per cent.†† 
Given the age profile of prisoners, we can be certain that the age adjusted prisoner death rate 
                                                          
** 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/676144/safet
y-in-custody-q3-2017.pdf, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msp0114st.pdf 
†† 1/(1.0218^32.1) = 0.5 
exceeded that of free English men in this era, but the death rates do not seem large enough to 
support the description of these ships as ‘floating tombs’ (Chamberlain 2008, Chapter 3). 
 An average stay of 933 days and a 5% death rate is obviously shockingly high by today’s 
standards, particularly as the population will have been made up by people who were 
overwhelmingly healthy, prime aged males at the start of their incarceration.  
 
7. Understanding duration 
 
Our data allow us to assess the extent to which the duration in captivity was random, as 
opposed to varying with nationality, rank, age, or other variables. The existing literature, for 
example, suggests that throughout history, prison experience has differed by rank. Yet, in spite 
of a substantial qualitative literature on the history of prisoners of war, this paper presents the 
first quantitative investigation of differences in treatment received.  
 We can investigate the causes of duration in captivity, using regression analysis. We 
seek to explain duration as a function of the date of capture, the distance between place of 
capture and prison, the status of the sailor, the type of ship, age, age heaping, height, 
nationality, and the reason that the period of captivity ended. The results are given in table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Explaining the duration of captivity  
 All Danish Norwegian 
 Coefficie
nt 
t-stat Coefficie
nt 
t-stat Coefficie
nt 
t-stat 
Captured in 1807 351.6 9.13 379.1 5.47 346.6 7.37 
Captured in 1808 420.5 11.61 430.3 6.88 424.8 9.20 
Captured in 1809 543.9 13.53 453.7 6.45 595.2 12.13 
Captured in 1810 675.8 15.56 399.4 5.18 770.4 14.60 
Captured in 1811 472.2 10.66 343.7 4.38 536.3 9.89 
Captured in 1812 303.0 5.44 260.2 2.38 349.8 5.35 
Transit days between capture 
and custody 
 
0.987 48.78 0.911 25.93 1.040 41.08 
Aged 12 or less -227.4 -2.53 -359.2 -2.00 -180.3 -1.69 
Aged 13 210.1 1.15   220.9 1.18 
Aged 14 79.63 0.78 181.0 1.01 46.70 0.37 
Aged 15 48.95 0.48 -255.3 -1.53 175.5 1.37 
Aged 16 217.4 3.25 160.0 1.44 243.7 2.91 
Aged 17 114.6 1.84 261.8 2.39 58.81 0.78 
Aged 18 58.93 1.30 118.7 1.64 29.48 0.51 
Aged 19 4.213 0.08 -17.62 -0.22 26.71 0.43 
Aged in 30s 40.31 1.82 31.13 0.86 49.50 1.78 
Aged in 40s 70.82 2.44 57.0 1.11 77.86 2.22 
Aged 50 or over -26.66 -0.80 -52.36 -0.88 -21.77 -0.54 
Age ends in 0 or 5 11.13 0.55 31.26 0.89 5.266 0.21 
Officer -136.5 -5.55 -145.6 -3.81 -116.8 -3.68 
       
Other ranks -33.48 -0.96 75.19 1.14 -47.70 -1.07 
Craftsman 97.0 1.80 234.1 3.14 -18.45 -0.24 
Military or Navy vessel -110.2 -3.85 -27.72 -0.67 -144.1 -3.54 
Privateer 27.46 1.09 187.4 4.14 -18.44 -0.57 
Unknown type of vessel -80.50 -2.56 -155.0 -2.74 -82.09 -2.07 
English vessel -71.10 -0.53 -174.3 -1.17   
Seized on land -166.7 -1.17 -166.9 -1.20   
Exchanged -229.9 -5.39 -298.7 -2.59 -182.3 -3.81 
Escaped -155.1 -2.33 -175.3 -1.39 -115.3 -1.46 
Died 72.82 1.93 90.02 1.38 68.73 1.50 
Height -11.08 -3.33 -15.36 -2.75 -9.713 -2.35 
Danish -163.4 -8.92     
Constant 1052.1 4.76 1,166.4 3.11 936.1 3.42 
Number of observations 3,641  1,188  2,453  
Adjusted R-squared 0.5186  0.4841  0.5361  
Notes: OLS regression. Units: days in captivity. Excluded category: Norwegian, captured 1813, 
common seaman, merchant vessel, released, no age heaping, aged 20-29. We exclude the 4 
sailors captured in 1814, a handful of days before the Treaty of Kiel was signed. 
 
 
Table 3 shows that we can explain the duration of capture relatively well – the adjusted 
R2 value is typically around 0.5. The results are broadly stable across the three different 
regressions. 
 Taking the sample as a whole, the simple average duration of custody was 933 days. As 
we would expect, those captured at the end of the war were held in custody for the shortest 
period, with those taken prisoner prior to 1813 (our omitted category) all having positive 
coefficients. . If all prisoners were held until the end of the war, the dummy variables on year of 
capture would rise by 365 for each year prior to 1813, less some allowance for deaths and 
escapes, and some statistical noise to reflect the fact that prisoners are not captured evenly 
throughout the year. This would mean that 1812 would take a value of around 365, 1811 a 
value of around 730, and so on. The value for 1812 – 303 – is not too far adrift, suggesting that 
those captured in 1812 were largely held until the end of the war. This is in line with the 
descriptive data in table 2. This pattern does not hold for earlier years, however. Those 
captured in 1811, for example, served six rather than twelve months more in prison than those 
captured the following year. Those captured earlier in the war did particularly well – being 
captured in 1807 led to a spell in prison just 48 days longer than being captured in 1813. Thus 
we can see a change in policy: initially prisoners were released, but as time went on it was more 
likely that they would be held for the duration of the war. Again this is line with table 2. This is 
our first finding: British policy towards prisoners of war changed during the war. Initially 
prisoners were released after being held for perhaps a year, but for those captured from 1809 
onwards, the modal (although not always majority) release date was the end of the war.  
 One powerful determinant of duration in captivity was the place of capture, and 
specifically its distance from Britain. Those who were captured far away, say in the Caribbean or 
in the Bay of Bengal, first had to be transferred to Britain. This created a large lag between the 
day when they were seized and their formal entry date into prison custody. This transit period 
barely reduced their time in prison having arrived. A coefficient of around 0.99 means that for 
every day in transit, a prisoner served 0.99 additional days in captivity, meaning that a day 
travelling towards the prison reduced the time in prison by just 0.01 of a day. Those in charge of 
prisons, who decided who to release from time to time, did not give any weight to the time 
spent in captivity prior to arriving in the prison itself. 
 Various other characteristics affected a sailor’s likely stay in captivity. Compared with 
people in their 20s, children – defined as those aged 12 or under – were more likely to be 
released early, but there is little evidence of any other form of age discrimination. The 
coefficient on the over 50s is negative, but nowhere near statistically significant. Other 
definitions of seniority yield the same result. No particular compassion was given to the oldest, 
or to those aged 13-19. 
 Officers were likely to stay less long in prison, typically spending 137 days fewer in 
captivity, confirming the earlier mentioned preferential treatment of the officer class. The 
coefficient on “Other ranks” – somewhere between officers and common seamen, is negative, 
but it not statistically significant. Craftsmen, in contrast, typically spent 97 days more in prison – 
perhaps because they were seen as useful by the authorities. Against that, age heaping, 
sometimes used as a measure of low human capital, has no effect. Those captured on military 
vessels also fared better, typically being released 110 days earlier than those with equivalent 
characteristics on merchant ships, and 138 days earlier than privateers with equivalent 
characteristics.  
 We can also compare the effect of different forms of exit. As we have noted, most 
people were simply released, but some were exchanged, some escaped, and some died. The 
number of prisoners exchanged was low, reflecting the post-French Revolution decline of the 
previous system whereby prisoner were exchanged routinely and rapidly (Daly 2004). But these 
prisoners were lucky, for they were imprisoned for 230 fewer days than would otherwise have 
been the case. This tells us something important about the exchange system: the British 
exchanges were real, that is, the prisoners released by the British authorities as exchanges were 
not those who would have been released at that point in any case.  
 The case for escaping seems weak. The coefficient is -155, meaning that escaping 
reduced the duration of imprisonment by almost half a year. It is statistically significant. What 
we do not know, however, is what happened to the escapees. Escaping from a prison hulk, 
whether by climbing over the top and jumping into the water, or sawing through the side, is 
one thing, finding your way home to Denmark or Norway is another. Escapees would have 
needed to swim to land, or seize a small boat in the vicinity of the prison ship. Even if they 
reached land safely, they would have spoken little English, and almost all would have had little 
money or other assets. It is difficult to be optimistic about their chances. Those recaptured 
would be put in the prison ‘black hole’, a room typically 6 feet square, on half rations, until the 
costs of their capture had been made up from the savings on rations. They were also made 
ineligible for exchange (Chamberlain, 2008, p. 38).  
 Finally the coefficient on dying is positive, rather than negative, although it is not (quite) 
statistically significant. This would only occur causally if the very sick were detained for longer, 
perhaps being too sick to release. Although possible, this seems implausible.  
 The tall served (slightly) less time in prison – each extra inch was associated with 11 
fewer days inside. Danes were also released more quickly than Norwegians, by 163 days. This is 
not a small amount, and we therefore investigate this effect further. We do so by using a Z test 
to assess whether the average duration of imprisonment was different for Danes and 
Norwegians released by the British. To that end, we exclude those who died, and those who 
escaped. We perform the test separately for people captured in each year, with the results 
reported in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Average stay in captivity, by nationality and year of capture 
 Danish Norwegian  
 Mean StDev N Mean StDev N Z 
1807 1,020 839 286 1,140 956 720 -1.96* 
1808 831 587 445 972 669 656 -3.71*** 
1809 871 543 126 1,128 682 251 -3.96*** 
1810 778 545 77 1,183 442 201 -5.83*** 
1811 599 405 70 872 330 177 -5.00*** 
1812 454 301 25 648 240 91 -2.97** 
1813 211 112 86 307 131 177 -6.10*** 
Notes: * = significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, *** significant at 0.1%, one tailed test. 
 
 
 
It is not clear why the British were more likely to release Danes than Norwegians, but it is 
clear that they were. The differences averaged half a year (177 days), with particular large 
differentials around the middle of the war.  
 For that reason we report the regression results for Danes and Norwegians separately in 
table 3. Most of the patterns found earlier for the combined group remain true. It was better to be 
captured early, when release was more common, or late, when war was about to end. This is 
particularly true for Norwegians. Danish craftsmen were in demand, but Norwegians were not: 
the latter’s duration of captivity was no different to that of ordinary sailors. The earlier finding 
that those captured on military ships were more likely to be released early turned out to be a 
Norwegian only effect, while the longer duration of stay for privateers is driven entirely by the 
fortunes of Danish sailors. Finally, exchanged Danish sailors – who were more likely to be 
exchanged in any case – were let out about 100 days earlier than exchanged Norwegian sailors. 
Overall it was clearly better to be Danish, although four-fifths of the advantage is negated by 
being a Danish privateer. Similarly, being on board a Norwegian military ship, rather than a 
merchant one, overcame about half the disadvantage of being Norwegian. We could speculate as 
to why the British exhibited these preferences, but these differences are best left to be explored 
by qualitative historians.  
 We have already noted that the rate of death was low compared with the rates suffered by 
other nineteenth century prisoners of war. We now go on to investigate whether death was a 
random event, or whether it was predictable. We do this via regression analysis. Since dying in 
captivity is a binary variable – you either die or you don’t – we use a probit analysis. The results 
are given in table 5. 
 
Table 5. What causes death in captivity? 
 All Danish Norwegian 
 Coefficien
 
t-stat Coefficien
 
t-stat Coefficien
 
t-stat 
Danish 0.049 -0.59  --  -- 
Captured in 1809 0.341 -3.08 0.378 -1.87 0.325 -2.4 
Captured in 1810 -0.021 -0.13 -0.356 -1 0.010 -0.06 
Captured in 1811 0.457 -3.43 0.666 -2.74 0.393 -2.4 
Captured in 1812 0.369 -1.84 0.470 -1.17 0.315 -1.35 
Captured in 1813 0.265 -1.77 0.316 -1.18 0.191 -1 
Days in captivity 0.000 -2.92 0.000 -1.59 0.000 -2.44 
Craftsman -0.645 -1.73  -- -0.432 -1.08 
Officer -0.038 -0.38 0.045 -0.26 -0.091 -0.72 
Other ranks 0.053 -0.31 -0.193 -0.56 0.216 -1.07 
Height 0.042 -2.57 0.059 -1.93 0.037 -1.88 
Merchant vessel 0.136 -1.08 0.171 -0.82 0.113 -0.69 
Privateer 0.284 -2.05 0.513 -2.26 0.202 -1.11 
Unknown type of 
 
0.103 -0.6 -0.042 -0.12 0.163 -0.77 
Aged in 30s 0.007 -0.07 -0.024 -0.14 0.013 -0.12 
Aged in 40s 0.048 -0.41 0.005 -0.02 0.057 -0.42 
Aged in 50s 0.002 -0.01 0.323 -1.29 -0.145 -0.81 
Aged 60 and over -0.266 -0.62  -- -0.101 -0.23 
Constant -4.855 -4.45 -6.049 -2.96 -4.460 -3.41 
Number of 
 
3,452  984  2,416  
Adjusted R-squared 0.0375  0.0778  0.0292  
Notes: Z scores in parentheses. The omitted category is military naval sailors in their 20s. No 
child age sailors or sailors aged over 60 died.  
 
 
The first thing to note about both regressions is that they explain (virtually) nothing. The 
pseudo R-squared is very close to zero: death was essentially random. This is an important 
finding. It rules out a large number of potential hypotheses. That the coefficient for 1809 is no 
higher than for 1812 suggests that the prison system worked well from the outset. We noted 
earlier that the number of prisoners was highest at the ends of 1808 and 1809. This could imply 
that arriving into captivity in 1809 had risks: the system could be creaking at the seams, putting 
pressure on food supplies, and making outbreaks of contagious diseases more likely, and more 
deadly if they happened. Arriving when the prisons are full certainly had bad outcomes in the 
US civil war. Costa and Kahn (2008, pp. 125-126) record that those who arrived when the camps 
were already full “faced ever-worsening conditions as the crowds of prisoners increased”. The 
death rate was 4 percent of men captured prior to mid-1863, and 27 percent subsequent to 
that date. There is no such pattern in our data. This was surely in part because the numbers 
imprisoned did not rise over time: releases were sufficiently numerous to prevent the prisoner 
of war population from rising. 
 As we would expect, the longer you are in prison, the greater your chance of dying. The 
coefficient is statistically significant for the sample as a whole, and for the Norwegian 
subsample, but not for the (smaller) Danish subsample. This does not prove that prison was bad 
for you: the chance of dying increases, by definition, if the time period is longer, whether or not 
you are in prison. Probit coefficients are not straightforward to interpret, and for that reason 
we report the additional percentage chance of dying in table 6.  
 
Table 6. The increase in the chance of dying according to the length of stay in prison 
 Extra chance of dying 
End of year 1 0.28% 
End of year 2 0.60% 
End of year 3 0.36% 
Notes: these results apply to ordinary sailors on military ships, in their 20s when captured in 
1808. The results would be similar for prisoners with other characteristics. 
 
 
These magnitudes are small. Being in prison for three years rather than one year increased the 
chance that you would die by only about 1 percentage point.  
 The coefficient on being Danish is not significant. There is no evidence that British 
offered better conditions to either the Danes or the Norwegians. The coefficients on age are 
not statistically significant: just as sailors of all ages were effective seamen, so they were able to 
cope with the rigours of life in a prison hulk, whatever their age. This fits with our earlier finding 
that age was not a good predictor of length of stay in prison. It is neither the case that older 
seamen were released more quickly, nor that they were more likely to die. 
 Nor are the coefficients significant for different types of prisoner. Officers were neither 
more nor less likely to die than common sailors. This is an important result. We know that even 
when held on board ship, officers were given more space, and were more likely to have had 
supplementary income from the Danish government with which to supplement their provisions. 
The fact that they were no less likely to die implies that the unsupplemented provisions for 
common sailors were sufficient to prevent any dangerous declines in health. 
 Taller sailors were slightly more likely to die, a pattern found elsewhere.‡‡ It seems 
plausible that, as in later prisoner of war situations, equal rations for all meant that the largest 
were most vulnerable. 
 Seamen who were captured on privateers were more likely to die than those captured 
on formal military vessels. The privateer coefficient is statistically significant on both the overall 
                                                          
‡‡ “The small thin man always stood the best chance.” Beevor (1999, chapter 24), describing the 
experience of German prisoners after the battle of Stalingrad. 
and Danish only regressions. A prisoner captured in 1808, aged in his 20s, had a 2.8 per cent 
chance of dying if he was captured on a military vessel, and a 5.2 per cent chance of dying if he 
was captured on a privateer. If we restrict our attention to the Danish sub-sample, the figures 
are 2.4 per cent and 7.2 per cent. These are not small differences. There is evidence, therefore, 
that privateers did badly in prison. The previous regression showed that privateers – and 
particularly Danish privateers – were likely to serve a longer term in prison than those who 
were captured from military vessels. This suggests that the prison authorities did not view them 
with favour, and this may have increased their chance of dying. This could have come about 
either because they were treated less favourably in the allocation of rations, or because other 
prisoners were less likely to be punished if they treated privateer prisoners less well.  
 Taken as a whole, the finding that death rates were low, and that, with the exception of 
the higher mortality rate for privateers, that deaths were essentially random, implying that 
conditions were overwhelmingly reasonable, and fair. This is a historically important finding. It 
certainly makes it hard to sustain the idea that prison hulks were ‘floating tombs.’ 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This article investigates the fortunes of the Danish and Norwegian sailors, military and 
merchant, captured by the British in the Napoleonic era. Specifically, it seeks to explain the 
duration of imprisonment, and the chances of dying.  
 We find that it is possible to explain a considerable proportion of the variation in the 
duration in prison. Those captured early were often released, whereas policy changed in the 
middle of the war, and releases became much less common. For that reason, duration of 
imprisonment was lower for prisoners captured early (before the policy change), or later (just 
before the end of the war), rather than in the middle of the war. Similarly, it was better to be 
captured close to England: the long journey as a captive from the Bay of Bengal did not reduce 
the time for which you were imprisoned on arrival.  
 As expected, being an officer reduced the time spent in prison, as did being Danish. 
Against that, (Danish but not Norwegian) craftsmen were held for longer than regular seamen. 
Being exchanged reduced time in prison, showing that those exchanged were genuine: these 
were not people who would have been released in any case. Excepting young children, age had 
no effect.  
 In contrast, it is not possible to explain death to any extent. That is in itself important: 
that the death rates were both low and (nearly) random tells us that conditions were 
reasonable. The survival strategies documented by Costa and Kahn, for example, were simply 
not necessary. You did not need to be on a prison ship with others from your unit, or your 
home town to survive. The only group for whom survival was less assured were privateers. They 
were about twice as likely to die as other sailors, with an even greater chance of death for 
Danish privateers. That said, the death rate for this group was still only 7 per cent, a low rate for 
people whose period of imprisonment was typically approaching three years.  
 The rations, fine on paper, appear to have been adequate in practice. Other conditions, 
relating to health, appear also to have been adequate. Serious violence at least was not 
endemic. Death was, as a result, rare. We conclude that the prison regime run by British 
authorities during the Napoleonic Wars was, taken as a whole, as good as might reasonably be 
expected in this era. Descriptions such as “floating tombs” are unwarranted.  
 We found that, as in so many wars, not all prisoners were treated equally. This was true 
by the Danish authorities – who sent different levels of support for different categories of 
prisoner. It was also true in terms of how the British treated their prisoners. These differences 
should not be overstated: death rates were not much different. What varied was the chance of 
exchange. Officers – even those captured more than once, those captured at the start of the 
war and younger children more likely to be released after a shorter time in captivity. Privateers 
were least likely to be exchanged.  The British appear to have exercised some moral 
judgements as to who to favour with release. 
 The qualitative evidence suggests that Danish and Norwegian officers were much better 
treated than common seamen. They received a greater allowance from their home country, 
and their freedom was much less restricted than the common seamen. Nonetheless, the 
quantitative assessment does indicate that the difference in treatment according to rank was 
small enough not to have had an impact on the rate of survival. This result supports the notion 
by Feldbæk, Roos, and Johnsen that all the Danes and Norwegians actually fared reasonably 
well in captivity, even if trusted prisoners in the prison hulks, and the officers housed in the 
English countryside all enjoyed a substantially greater freedom and welfare. 
 A prison hulk will never have a great reputation as a place of incarceration, nor should it. 
But there were previously, contemporaneously, and subsequently, far worse places to have 
been held as a prisoner of war. Confinement on board a British prison hulk was a surprisingly 
gentle experience for captured Danish and Norwegian sailors. 
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Appendix 
 
Stata codes: 
regress Days_in_captivity Height danish C1807 C1808 C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 
Days_between_capture_and_custody Craftsman Officer other Military_Navy Privateer 
unknown_vessel_type English_vessel seized_on_land exchanged escaped died A12andless A13 
A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A30s A40s A50plus Hx05 if transferred ==0 & C1814==0 
regress Days_in_captivity Height danish C1807 C1808 C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 
Days_between_capture_and_custody Craftsman Officer other Military_Navy Privateer 
unknown_vessel_type English_vessel seized_on_land exchanged escaped died A12andless A13 
A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A30s A40s A50plus Hx05 if transferred ==0 & C1814==0 & danish 
regress Days_in_captivity Height danish C1807 C1808 C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 
Days_between_capture_and_custody Craftsman Officer other Military_Navy Privateer 
unknown_vessel_type English_vessel seized_on_land exchanged escaped died A12andless A13 
A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A30s A40s A50plus Hx05 if transferred ==0 & C1814==0 & danish==0 
probit died Days_in_captivity A30s A40s A50s A60_ Height Craftsman Officer other Merchant 
Privateer unknown_vessel_type danish   C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 C1813 if A20andover 
probit died Days_in_captivity A30s A40s A50s A60_ Height Craftsman Officer other Merchant 
Privateer unknown_vessel_type danish   C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 C1813 if A20andover & 
danish 
probit died Days_in_captivity A30s A40s A50s A60_ Height Craftsman Officer other Merchant 
Privateer unknown_vessel_type danish   C1809 C1810 C1811 C1812 C1813 if A20andover & 
danish==0 
mean(Height) if A20andover 
* gives 65.66871 
mean(danish) if A20andover 
* gives 0.3415099 
*takes the regression for all obs and inserts mean Height, mean Danish variables, and the 
relevant number of days, to work out effect of being on the hulk for another year 
*assumes captured in 1808, seaman, military ship 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*0 
* gives -2.0849063 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*1 
* gives -2.0261778 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*2 
* gives -1.9674493 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*3 
* gives -1.9087208 
display normal(-2.0849063) 
* gives .0185389 
display normal(-2.0261778) 
* gives .02137328 
display normal(-1.9674493) 
* gives .02456572 
display normal(-1.9087208) 
*gives .02814906 
*to get the change in the chance of dying, do a subtraction of the results of the display normal.  
*0 to 1: 
display (normal(-2.0261778) - normal(-2.0849063)) 
*1 to 2 
display (normal(-2.0849063) - normal(-1.9674493)) 
*2 to 3 
display (normal(-1.9674493) - normal(-1.9087208)) 
*nb a result of 0.001 means 0.1% 
* Now does likewise to find effect of privateer variable, on all, and then on Danes.  
* Assumptions as per last, assumes 3 year stay 
* ALL sailors: 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*3 
display normal(-1.9087208) 
* gives .02814906, i.e. 2.8% chance of a military ship sailor dying 
display  -4.854959+  .0419273*65.66871+  .0490206 *0.3415099+ 0.0001609*365*3 +  
0.2841024 
display normal(-1.6246184) 
 * gives .05212195 - i.e. a ~5% chance of death for privateers 
display (normal(-1.6246184) - normal(-1.9087208)) 
* gives .02397289, i.e. a 2.4 %pp increase in death rate for privateers cf military sailors. 
* Danes only: 
display  -6.048599 + .0590138 *65.66871 + .0001799 * 365 *3 
* gives -1.9762484 
. display normal(-1.9762484) 
* gives .02406333, i.e. 2.4% chance of military sailors dying 
. display  -6.048599 + .0590138 *65.66871 + .0001799 * 365 *3 + .5130807 
* gives -1.4631677 
. display normal(-1.4631677) 
* gives .07171075, i.e a ~7% chance of privateer sailor dying 
. display (normal(-1.4631677) - normal(-1.9762484)) 
* gives .04764742, i.e. a 4.8%pp increase in death rate for privateers cf military sailors 
 
 
 
 
